To statistically evaluate the performance of brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), researchers usually rely on null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), i.e. p-values. However, overreliance on NHST is often identified as one of the causes of the recent reproducibility crisis in psychology and neuroscience. In this paper we propose Bayesian estimation as an alternative to NHST in the analysis of BCI performance data. For the three most common experimental designs in BCI research -which would usually be analyzed using a t-test, a linear regression, or an ANOVA -we develop hierarchical models and estimate their parameters using Bayesian inference. Furthermore, we show that the described models are special cases of the hierarchical generalized linear model (HGLM), which we propose as a general framework for the analysis of BCI performance. The HGLM framework allows the analysis of complex experimental designs with multiple levels of hierarchy (e.g. multiple sessions, multiple subjects, multiple groups) and can accommodate different types of nonnormal data (e.g. classification accuracy), which are often analyzed under inappropriate assumptions with NHST. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed models on three real datasets and show how the results obtained with Bayesian estimation can give a more nuanced insight into BCI performance data, compared to NHST. Therefore we believe that a wider adoption of the Bayesian estimation approach in BCI studies could bring about greater transparency in data analysis, allow accumulation of knowledge across studies, and reduce questionable practices such as "p-hacking". To achieve this goal, we provide all the data and code necessary to reproduce the presented results, allowing BCI researchers to use Bayesian estimation in their own work. 
evidence from 49 meta-analyses [2] . Low statistical power is 48 Corresponding author: Filip Melinscak (filip.melinscak@bitbrain.es) not only a concern because of the wasted resources, but also 1 because the statistically significant results from low-powered 2 studies have small probability of actually being true. Second, to estimate the reproducibility of psychological science [3] . 5 This collaborative effort entailed replicating 100 experiments, 6 mainly from the fields of social and cognitive psychology.
7
Although 97% of original studies were statistically significant 8 at the 5% significance level, only 36% of replications reached 9 significance; moreover, the mean effect size of the replications 10 was halved in magnitude with respect to originally reported 11 effects. These results have prompted calls for reform and the 12 current situation has been referred to as a "reproducibility 13 crisis" or a "statistical crisis" in science [4] .
14 Although research on brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) is 15 often focused on the engineering challenges, much of ex-16 perimental methodology and statistical practices have been 17 inherited from fields such as psychology and neuroscience. 18 Hence, it seems prudent to also consider the implications of 19 the statistical crisis on BCI research. With the recent advances 20 in BCI research, which have brought BCIs closer both to 21 markets and clinics, the stakes that depend on the veracity 22 of research claims have also risen. The need of more rigorous 23 statistical treatment of BCI results has been recognized [5] [6] [7] , 24 but the literature on the topic is still scant, and the statistical 25 validation is in practice often carried out mechanistically and 26 under inappropriate assumptions.
27
One of the issues often identified as the crux of the statistical 28 crisis in science is the heavy reliance on null hypothesis 29 significance testing (NHST), i.e. p-values. The reliance on 30 NHST has been widely criticized in the statistical litera-31 ture, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to rehash 32 all the arguments surrounding NHST (for some discussion 33 see references [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] ). One of the proposed solutions for 34 the deficiencies of NHST is the so-called "Bayesian new 35 statistics" [15] . This framework differs from NHST in two 36 major ways: first, instead of hypothesis testing, the goal is 37 estimation of model parameters with uncertainty; and second, 38 instead of using frequentist inference, parameters are estimated 39 using Bayesian inference. 40 In the area of BCI research and brain decoding studies, 41 Bayesian methods have already shown promise in the analysis 42 of classification results. ence to test the hypothesis of a decoder performing at chance 44 level in a population of users [16] . An important feature of 45 this work is that the decoder performance is modeled in a 46
• "how is some independent variable of interest associated 48 with BCI performance?", 49 • "how does performance of different BCI approaches 50 compare?" 51 We will now consider how NHST answers these questions, 52 what are some of the problems associated with this statistical 2) computing the p-value, 6 3) rejecting the null hypothesis if the p-value is smaller than 7 the predetermined significance level α (usually fixed at 8 5%).
9
Corresponding to the three most common BCI research ques-10 tions, the null hypothesis usually takes on one of the following 11 forms: (i) a BCI is operating at the chance level in the subject 12 population; (ii) there is no association between an independent 13 variable of interest (e.g. hours of sleep) and BCI performance; 14 (iii) there is no difference in performance between multi-15 ple experimental or computational approaches (e.g. utilizing 16 different stimuli or classifiers). These null hypotheses are 17 usually tackled using the t-test, linear regression, or ANOVA, 18 respectively.
19
We can now see the first problem of NHST in BCI research 20 -most often we do not a priori believe the exact null 21 hypotheses: BCIs rarely work exactly at chance level in the 22 user population, there is usually some association between 23 an independent variable and BCI performance, and multiple 24 computational or experimental approaches will almost never 25 yield the same performance. This has the worrying implication 26 that we can always reject the null hypothesis as long as 27 we collect enough data. A related problem is that a p-value 28 gives us the probability of the data given the null hypothesis 29 P (data|H 0 ), whereas we usually conduct experiments in order 30 to assess the plausibility of hypotheses in the light of the 31 observed data, i.e. to obtain the probability P (H 0 |data). 32 Moreover, the p-value gives us no indication of the estimated 33 effect size or uncertainty of the estimate, which is what we 34 usually care about -for example, we usually want to know 35 how well a BCI is performing and how certain we are in this 36 estimate, rather than if the accuracy is strictly above chance 37 level.
38
Another problematic aspect of p-values is their dependency 39 on the unobserved data. Although p-values are often used for 40 their supposed objectivity, they depend on the usually unstated 41 and possibly unknowable intentions of the experimenter and 42 the analyst -both the decision to stop collecting data and 43 testing intentions affect p-values. For example, recomputing 44 p-values after every subject has a 100% chance of eventually 45 obtaining a significant result with a flexible sampling plan, 46 even when the null hypothesis is exactly true. But even when 47 the sampling plan is pre-specified and there is no problem 48 of multiple comparisons (i.e. "p-hacking"), if data analysis 49 choices are made contingent on the obtained data, or interim 50 results, the p-values are no longer valid. This is known as 51 the problem of researchers' degrees of freedom [18] or the 52 problem of the "garden of forking paths" [19] . The problem 53 of p-values' sensitivity to testing and stopping intentions 54 is particularly relevant to BCI research where degrees of 55 freedom in data analysis abound, choices of a computational 56 approach are often contingent on interim results (e.g. choosing 57
NHST and p-values with the estimation of effect sizes and 23 providing frequentist confidence intervals (CIs) for the esti- 2) estimating the model parameters conditional on the 7 observed data using the Bayes' rule (i.e. computing the 8 posterior probability distribution of the parameters), 9 3) communicating the inference results (i.e. the posterior 10 distribution) using numerical and graphical summaries.
11
C. NHST vs. Bayesian estimation: a simple illustration
12
Since BCI literature is dominated by NHST, and Bayesian 13 estimation is not yet a common practice in BCI research, we 14 will now compare the two approaches on a simple example. 15 We will use a common setup for both methods, assuming 16 that we have experimentally obtained a random, independent 17 sample d = {y i |i = 1, . . . , N }, where i indexes individual 18 observations of a continuous random variable y, and N is the 19 sample size. We have generated one such dataset (N = 14) 20 using random normal numbers with mean 1 and standard 21 deviation 3; the dataset is shown in Figure 1 .A. Let us suppose 22 that the goal of the experiment is to characterize the mean of 23 the population from which the sample has been drawn.
24
In both NHST and Bayesian estimation, the first step is to 25 hypothesize a model that could describe the data generating 26 mechanism. In this example, the data generating mechanism 27 is known but we will model the data as being normally 28 distributed with unknown mean and variance parameters, i.e. 29 y ∼ Normal(µ, σ
2 ). The model can also be represented 30 graphically, by a directed acyclic graph (DAG), as shown in 31 Figure 1 .B.
32
In the NHST framework, the statistical question that might 33 correspond to the substantive goal of characterizing the mean 34 of the population is "does the mean µ differ significantly 35 from 0?" An appropriate statistical test of this null hypothesis, 36 under the given model assumptions, would be the t-test. In 37 the given example the value of the t-statistic is 1.09 and the 38 corresponding p-value is 0.29. Therefore, we would not reject 39 the null hypothesis that the mean µ equals 0, at the usual 0.05 40 significance level.
41
In contrast, Bayesian estimation answers the question "what 42 are the plausible values of the population mean µ?" The ques-43 tion is answered by the posterior distribution p(µ, σ|d), which 44 provides the plausibility of all parameter values, conditional 45 on the data. The posterior can be obtained by applying the 46 Bayes' rule, i.e. combining the observed data d, the assumed 47 model of the data (in the form of a likelihood function 48 p(d|µ, σ)), and the prior knowledge (in the form of a prior 49 distribution p(µ, σ)). The full posterior for the given example 50 is shown in Figure 1 .C, and it contains all the information 51 about the parameters that is provided by the data, but also 52 by the prior (unlike in NHST). Since the main question in 53 the given example relates only to the mean parameter µ, we 54 can summarize the full posterior p(µ, σ|d) with the marginal 55 posterior p(µ|d) shown in Figure 1 .D (for comparison with 56 We can now compare conclusions drawn from NHST and
10
Bayesian estimation on the given dataset. Whereas NHST can be used to judge if the experimental design is adequate to 10 answer research questions of interest, and modify the design if 11 necessary. Lastly, the outlined process is not meant to cover all 12 possible elements of an analysis, but rather provide a rough 13 guideline. Therefore some important tools -such as model 14 comparison, sample size planning, sensitivity analysis, etc. 15 -have been omitted from the described framework, but are 16 touched upon in the Discussion section.
17
We now illustrate the outlined Bayesian estimation approach 18 on the three most common experimental designs in BCI 19 research, listed here in the order of increasing complexity:
20
• performance of a single BCI in a group of subjects 21 (Model 1),
22
• association between a subject-specific variable and BCI 23 performance (Model 2),
24
• comparison of different BCI approaches in a within-25 subject design (Model 3).
26
Subsequently, we show that these three models are special 27 cases of the hierarchical generalized linear model, which is 28 proposed as an encompassing model for the analysis of BCI 29 performance.
30
A. Model 1: performance of a single BCI in a group of 31 subjects
32
A common question in BCI research, especially when 33 introducing a novel computational or experimental approach, 34 is "how well does a BCI approach perform in a particular 35 population of subjects?" To answer the question a simple 36 experimental design is used: the performance of the BCI is 37 recorded for a sample of subjects, with multiple trials per 38 subject. The goal of statistical inference is then to estimate the 1 mean and the variance of BCI performance in the population 2 from which the subjects were recruited.
3
We will first assume that the data d from the experiment has
where i is the index of the subject, y i is the number of 6 successful trials, and T i is the total number of trials. The 7 model for this experimental design is shown in Figure 2 , and 8 we now examine the assumptions behind the model and the 9 interpretation of its parameters. If we assume that each of the T i trials is an independent 11 binary random variable (which indicates success or failure of 12 the BCI), then the total subject-wise number of successful 13 trials y i can be modeled as a binomial random variable with 14 the probability of success ψ i (i.e. individual accuracy).
15
Next, we would like to model the subject-wise performance 16 as being a sample from a population, which could in turn be 
25
where O(ψ) are the odds corresponding to probability ψ. E.g.
26
this transformation will map probabilities 0, 0.5, and 1 to log-27 odds of −∞, 0, and +∞, respectively. 
4 where µ ψ is the group-level accuracy on the probability scale.
5
Although the probability scale might be more common in 6 practice (and thus more intuitive), we would argue that the 7 log-odds scale has an important advantage in interpretation.
8
Consider the following two cases: (i) increase of accuracy 9 from 51% to 52%, and (ii) increase of accuracy from 98% 10 to 99%. Although both cases represent a unit increase in 11 probability, the first increase would usually be practically 12 negligible, whereas the same increase in the second case could 13 be of significant practical value because it halves the frequency 14 of errors. In contrast, the corresponding improvements on the 15 log-odds scale -0.04 and 0.7, respectively -more closely 16 reflect the practical importance of the accuracy increase.
17
The last step before applying the Bayes' rule is to define the 18 prior distributions of the top-level model parameters µ α and 19 σ α . For the group-level mean µ α we use a vague normal prior 20 on the logit scale with mean M µα = 0 and standard deviation 21 S µα = √ 2. This choice of a prior corresponds to a fairly 22 uniform distribution on the probability scale, indicating the 23 lack of strong prior information [28, p. 85] . For the variance 24 between subjects we use a uniform prior over the standard 25 deviation σ α , with a lower bound L σα = 0 and a relatively 26 large upper bound U σα = 10, again indicating the lack of 27 prior information, and letting the data to drive the inference 28 (for other choices consult refs. [29] [30] [31] ).
29
Since we are often interested not only in the average 30 performance and variance in the population, but also in pre-31 dicting the performance of future subjects, we define predicted 32 performance of a new subject α on the logit scale, or equiva-33 lently ψ on the probability scale. The distribution of predicted 34 performance reflects our posterior uncertainty about both the 35 population-level mean and variance, given the data that we 36 have observed in the experiment.
37
Example dataset for Model 1: To illustrate the analysis 38 with Model 1, we chose the study of Power et al. [32] . 39 This study investigated whether it is possible to implement a 40 NIRS-based BCI for binary communication by differentiating 41 cognitive tasks of mental arithmetic and music imagery. Each 42 of the 10 healthy subjects participated in three experimental 43 sessions, with each session consisting of 17 trials of mental 44 arithmetic, and 17 trials of music imagery: in total there were 45 102 trials for each subject, with balanced class proportions 46 (hence, the chance level was 50%). The BCI was tested using 47 5-fold cross-validation, and the paper describing the study 48 provides the accuracy obtained in cross-validation (averaged 49 across folds) for each subject, with the trials from all the 50 sessions aggregated together. The exact number of trials that 51 were correctly classified is not provided for each subject, and 52 therefore we have obtained the approximate number of correct 53 trials by multiplying the reported subject-wise accuracy with 54 the total number of trials, and rounding to the nearest integer. to be recorded.
10
The data obtained from such an experiment can be repre-
11
sented as a list of triples d = {(y i , T i , x i )|i = 1, . . . , N S }.
12
The i, y i and T i have the same meaning as in Model 1 and is specified in Figure 3 . 1 .
31
1 Had we not standardized the covariate x, the intercept β 0 would be interpreted as the expected logit accuracy µ when the value of the covariate x was zero, and the slope β 1 would be interpreted as the change in the expected µ for a unit increase in x. In many cases the zero value for the covariate x might not be meaningful. Moreover, standardizing x leads to scale invariance, allowing for easier modeling of the slope β 1 .
Although the log-odds scale is mathematically convenient parameters β 0 , β 1 , and a known value of the covariate z: 10 11 where we have used eqn. (1) to relate logit accuracy α with 12 odds of success O(ψ), and the specification of the model in 13 Figure 3 to compute the expectation. In this formulation we 14 can interpret exp(β 0 ) as the baseline odds and exp(β 1 ) as the 15 factor by which the baseline odds are multiplied for a unit 16 increase in the covariate z.
17
The interpretation of the variance parameter σ α also changes 18 relative to the same parameter in Model 1: σ α no longer 19 represents the overall between-subject variance, but rather the 20 between-subject variance observed when we account for the 21 the covariate x (i.e. the variance unexplained by the covariate). 22 The priors for the top-level parameters β 0 , β 1 , and σ α are 23 again relatively vague, expressing the lack of prior information 24 or the intention to let the data determine the inferences. For the 25 intercept β 0 we use the same vague prior as for the group-level 26 mean µ α of Model 1. For the slope β 1 we use a "skeptical" 27 normal prior, with mean M β1 = 0 (indicating lack of prior 28 information on the direction of the effect), but with a large 29 standard deviation S β1 = 5, allowing the inferred effect to 30 have a large size, if such an inference is supported by the data 31 (see refs. [31, 33] for more discussion of priors in logistic 32 regression). For the unexplained variance parameter σ α we 33 use the same prior as in Model 1.
34
Although the predicted accuracy α is not specified in 35 Figure 3 for the sake of simplicity, it is obtained similarly 36 as it was in Model 1, with a minor addition -it is necessary 37 to specify all the values of the covariate x for which we wish 38 to predict the accuracy.
39
Example dataset for Model 2: To illustrate the analysis 40 with Model 2, we chose the study of Blankertz et al. [34] . 41 This study investigated if there is an association between the 42 spectral power of resting state EEG in the alpha band over the 43 motor cortex, and the subsequent performance in operating 44 a motor imagery BCI for binary selection. Each of the 80 45 healthy subjects participated in two phases of the experiment 46 -a calibration phase and an online feedback phase. The 47 calibration phase was used to train the BCI and the feedback 48 phase was used to test it in a balanced, binary selection 49 task (hence, the chance level was 50%). The feedback phase 50 consisted of three runs, each with 100 trials. Out of the 100 51 trials in each feedback run, 20 were used for the adaptation of 52 the BCI, and 80 were used to test it. Therefore, the maximum 53 number of test trials per subject was 240, but some of the 54 subjects did not complete all of the feedback runs. While 55 the subject-wise values of the covariate (i.e. resting alpha 56 power) and the accuracies are available in the paper describing 57 the study, the subject-wise numbers of trials are not given; The third common question in BCI research that we con-6 sider in this paper is "how well do different BCI approaches 7 work in a population of subjects?" Here under the "BCI 8 approach" we denote both differences in the employed ex-9 perimental paradigm (e.g. changing the set of used stimuli) 10 and differences in the computational implementation of the 11 BCI (e.g. changing the used classifier). We also constrain The data of a single-factor, within-subject BCI experi- from the grand-average β 0 , it is necessary to constrain the 52 two sums over these sets of parameters to zero (i.e. sum-to-53 zero or STZ constraints). The parameter σ α is interpreted as 54 the variance that has not been explained neither by the factor-55 specific effects, nor by subject-specific effects. The predicted variables have again been omitted from the 4 model in Figure 4 for the sake of simplicity. To predict the 5 logit accuracy α k of a future subject for all the levels k of 6 the experimental factor, we first define the predicted subject-7 specific effect η which depends on the inferred σ η . Then we 8 model the dependency of α k on the predicted effect η and the 9 inferred top level parameters β 0 , β 1,k , and σ α .
10
Example dataset for Model 3: To illustrate the analysis with 11 Model 3, we chose the study of Brunner et al. [35] . This study 12 compared three EEG-based BCI approaches for binary selec-13 tion: a motor-imagery paradigm based on the event-related 14 desynchronization (ERD), a visual paradigm based on steady-15 state visual evoked potentials (SSVEP), and a hybrid paradigm 16 combining motor imagery and visual stimulaton. Each of the 17 12 healthy subjects used all of the three BCI approaches in a 18 binary selection task with balanced classes (chance accuracy 19 was 50%). The experiment consisted of a calibration phase and 20 an online feedback phase. The calibration phase was used to 21 train the BCIs and the feedback phase was used to test them. 22 Although the BCIs were also tested within the calibration 23 phase using cross-validation, here we only consider the results 24 from the feedback phase. The feedback phase consisted of 25 three runs, one per each BCI approach, with 40 trials per run. 26
D. A unifying model for the analysis of BCI performance

27
In the previous sections we have described a general 28 methodology based on Bayesian parameter estimation and 29 presented three use cases for the arguably most typical ex-30 perimental designs in BCI research. All three models can be 31 derived from a common model, the hierarchical generalized 32 linear model (HGLM) [36] . Using this HGLM framework it 33 is also possible to derive models that cover other experimental 1 designs. We now describe the HGLM for BCI performance and 2 provide some directions on how to extend its applicability. 3 An HGLM for classification accuracy can be described as: based on a linear prediction from explanatory variables x i,k .
12
Previously described models 1 and 2 are direct instances of 13 the described HGLM for accuracy. We can obtain Model 1 14 by modifying the linear predictor of equation (5) 
36 37 Here we have used the varying intercepts β 0,i to model the It is also worth to consider cases of multi-class classification 45 and classification with unbalanced classes. In both situations 46 the HGLM described in equations (3)- (5) To inspect the properties of the joint posterior distribution 19 p(θ|d), we have obtained a random sample from it by using 20 Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation [41] . For 21 MCMC sampling we used the freely available WinBUGS 22 software [42] . For each of the analyses we ran three parallel 23 MCMC chains, recording 50000 samples per each chain, after 24 discarding the first 50000 samples (burn-in period). For each 25 of the parameters presented in the Results section we have 26 verified that the effective sample size was at least 10000 27 samples (i.e. Monte Carlo standard error was below 1% of the 28 standard deviation of the parameter). Furthermore, we have 29 checked the convergence of the chains by visual inspection of 30 the traces and by verifying that the Gelman-Rubin statistic was 31 below 1.1, which is usually taken as a threshold to diagnose 32 convergence issues [43, 44] .
33
IV. RESULTS
34
A. Results from Model 1 on the example dataset
35
For Model 1 we will inspect both the parameter estimates 36 at the subject level and at the group level. Although group 37 level parameters are usually of greater interest, as we want 38 to generalize out of the sample of the subjects, subject-level 39 inferences might also be of interest -for example, if a pilot 40 study is performed with the intention of screening subjects for 41 a future study. In Figure 5 we show the results of estimating 42 the parameters of Model 1 on the example dataset of Power et 43 al. In Figure 5 .A the obtained marginal posterior distributions 44 of subject-level accuracies ψ i are summarized by their medians 45 and 95% CIs. Comparing the posterior medians to sample 46 accuracies, we can see the pooling (or shrinkage) effect of 47 the hierarchical model, where we have assumed the subjects' 48 accuracies come from a common normal distribution (on the 49 logit scale). For each subject, its accuracy estimate is influ-50 enced by the estimates for all the other subjects. This is most 51 evident in the subjects which are further from the group mean 52 accuracy: for this subjects estimates are most strongly shrunk 53 towards the group mean. In this way information is pooled 54 The posterior for the group mean accuracy µ ψ on the probability scale, together with the posterior predictive distribution of accuracy ψ on the probability scale and the observed sample accuracies (horizontal lines indicate 95% CI). The probability densities are obtained using kernel density estimation on the MCMC sample.
across subjects, and we avoid making extreme inferences based 1 on noisy data, since shrinkage acts as a form of regularization.
2 Figure 5 .B shows the results of inference at the group-level to be practically useful; we might therefore be interested in 36 the probability that the mean group accuracy is above 70%. out the other variables, and determining the proportion of 10 samples of µ ψ larger than 70% by simply counting them 11 corresponds to integrating the marginal probability distribution 12 of µ ψ . In the example dataset, the posterior probability that 13 group average accuracy exceeds 70% is P (µ ψ > 0.7|d) = 14 P (µ α > 0.847|d) ≈ 99.4%. From the posterior predictive 15 distribution of future subject's accuracy ψ, we can find out 16 also what is the probability that a future subject will obtain 17 accuracy larger than 70%: P ( ψ > 0.7|d) ≈ 85.8%.
18
As a qualitative check of the model, we can graphically 19 compare the posterior predictive distribution of subject-wise 20 accuracy with the observed subject-wise sample accuracies, 21 and see if the observed data is credible given the model. In 22 the presented case it seems that the model properly predicts 23 (or "postdicts") the data from which it has been estimated, 24 therefore not eliminating the model as a good description of 25 the data. From Model 2 results, we will for brevity only look into the 28 results at the group-level, although the subject-level parameter 29 estimates are also available in the full joint posterior. In 30 Figure 6 we show the dataset of Blankertz et al., as well as 31 the results of inference based on Model 2. Figure 6 .A shows 32 values of the recorded covariate (alpha log-power) and the 33 sample accuracies obtained by subjects. For reference, in this 34 figure we also present the linear model fitted using ordinary 35 estimates are not correlated for the given dataset. In Figure 6 .C with the probability P (logit The model fit (i.e. posterior median of accuracy for a given 26 value of the covariate), the point-wise confidence intervals, and 27 the point-wise prediction intervals are shown in Figure 6 .D.
28
It is instructive to compare this model fit to the linear model 29 fit in Figure 6 .A. not pursued the direction of constraining the model only to 10 above chance accuracies.
11
C. Results from Model 3 on the example dataset
12
With Model 3, we again look only at the group level results, 13 although the inference procedure also provides us with the 14 subject-level parameter estimates (in the full joint posterior). 15 Figure 7 shows the dataset of Brunner et al. [35] and the 16 results obtained from using Model 3 with this dataset. In 17 Figure 7 .A we can see the sample accuracies recorded for 18 each of the subject with the three proposed BCI approaches 19 -ERD, SSVEP, and hybrid. The sample accuracies recorded 20 within the same subject are connected to indicate the within-21 subject nature of the experimental design.
22
The inferred posteriors of accuracy for different approaches 23 are shown in Figure 7 .B with violin plots. To obtain the 24 inferred approach-specific accuracy, it is necessary to sum 25 the grand average parameter β 0 (common to all the levels of 26 the factor) and the approach-specific parameter β 1,k , where k 27 indicates the level of the factor (in this dataset k ∈ 1, 2, 3, 28 and corresponds to ERD, SSVEP, and hybrid approaches, 29 respectively). This yields the accuracy on the logit scale, so we 30 need to apply the inverse-logit mapping to obtain accuracies on 31 the probability scale; i.e. the marginal distributions of interest 32 are p(logit However, the main questions of interest in studies of this 1 type pertain to the differences between different approaches.
2
We explore the differences between approaches in Figure 7 .C.
3
For example, if we were interested in the difference between 4 the hybrid and ERD approach we would take the estimate of Figure 7 .C, but we omit them for brevity. Again the problem could be tackled by constricting the model 7 to above-chance accuracies. A. What have we gained from rejecting NHST?
10
In this paper we have proposed an alternative to NHST for 11 statistical validation of BCI results: Bayesian estimation with 12 the hierarchical generalized linear model. While we have mo-13 tivated the use of these methods on theoretical considerations 14 from statistics and empirical findings from other disciplines, 15 we can now directly compare hierarchical Bayesian estimation 16 with NHST on analyses of real BCI results.
17
Performance of a single BCI in a group of subjects (Model 18 1): In the dataset of Power et al. [32] NHST analysis can 19 proceed at two levels: single-subject level and group level. At 20 the single-subject level, we can test for each subject if the 21 obtained number of correct trials is above chance level using 22 the binomial test. In the given dataset binomial tests would 23 reject the null hypothesis of chance level performance for all 24 of the subjects. However, implicit in the tests is the assumption 25 that the subject-wise number of trials was fixed before the 26 experiment, which may often not be the case in practice (e.g. 27 when artifactual trials are rejected).
28
Another option at this point is to apply one of the multiple 29 comparison corrections (e.g. Bonferroni correction) to the 30 family of subject-wise tests, in order to ensure that the type 31 I error rate is preserved at the level α. In the given dataset, 32 after Bonferroni correction one subject-wise test would not 33 be considered significant anymore. It is worth noting that the 34 multiple comparison correction at the subject-level has an un-35 desirable property: assuming that the subject-wise accuracies 36 are samples from a population (i.e. they have a fixed mean), all 1 the subject-wise tests will be non-significant if a large enough 2 sample is used. In this case, using a large sample is detrimental 3 to inference, counter to intuition and desired behavior of the 4 procedure.
5
At the group level, we would usually first summarize 6 subject-wise data by the sample accuracy, and assume that 7 these sample accuracies are drawn from a normal group-level 8 distribution; then we can use a right-tail t-test to test the null 9 hypothesis that the group-level mean is equal or smaller than 10 chance level. In the given dataset the p-value for this null 11 hypothesis is smaller than 0.001, and thus we can reject the 12 null hypothesis of chance level operation. At the group level, we can again provide the posterior prob-53 ability that the the group-level mean is above chance level, and 54 this probability in the given dataset is ∼100%. However, as we 55 have pointed out earlier, a reasonably motivated BCI approach 56 will rarely work at exactly chance level in a population of 57 subjects, and thus the posterior probability of the group mean 58 being over chance level is of limited value. Again, by using 1 the estimation approach we are able to give more complete 2 insight: we can provide the full posterior distribution over the 3 group mean and inter-subject variance, and we can further 4 summarize the posterior using point and interval estimates. For 5 example, in the given dataset we can summarize the posterior 6 by stating that the group-level mean accuracy is between 7 72.2% and 82.2% with 95% probability. Depending on the 8 analyst's practical or research goals and peers' judgment, this 9 estimate may or may not be sufficiently precise. In the latter 10 case the Bayesian framework allows us to simply collect more 11 data and update the posterior again using the Bayes' rule, 12 still obtaining valid probabilities. In contrast, p-values and 13 frequentist CIs would be invalidated by such additional data 14 collection.
15
Additionally, in the proposed framework we can also predict 16 the future data. For example, we might be interested what is 17 the predicted accuracy for a new subject given the data we have 18 observed in the experiment. We can obtain this information 19 from the posterior predictive distribution over future data. In 20 the given dataset the predicted accuracy for a new subject is 21 between 59.6% and 89.1% with 95% probability. While the 22 posterior estimates of parameters such as mean and variance 23 can be made more precise by collecting more data, the pre-24 dicted accuracy estimate will not necessarily become narrower 25 with more data since it depends on inter-subject variability 26 inherent to the BCI that is being tested. In the case that the 27 prediction interval is too wide for practical purposes, the BCI 28 approach itself should be modified to reduce the inter-subject 29 variability in performance.
30
Whereas modeling assumptions are rarely verified when 31 applying NHST in practice, in the proposed framework of 32 Bayesian estimation we can use the posterior predictive check 33 to assess if the assumptions of the model are justified. In 34 the given dataset we can inspect the posterior predictive 35 distribution of accuracy, and verify that the observed data does 36 not deviate systematically from it.
37
Association between a subject-specific variable and BCI 38 performance (Model 2): In the dataset of Blankertz et al. [34] 39 NHST can again proceed at both single-subject and group 40 level, but we will focus only on the group level, since the 41 effect of a subject-specific covariate on accuracy can only 42 be observed at this level. A typical NHST analysis for this 43 experimental design would involve using linear regression to 44 associate the covariate with accuracy and performing a t-test 45 to determine if the slope of the association is significantly 46 different than zero. In the given dataset the p-value obtained 47 from the t-test is smaller than 0.001 and we can reject the null 48 hypothesis that the slope is zero.
49
Apart from the aforementioned problems of disregarding 50 the hierarchical nature of data and inappropriately assuming 51 normally distributed data, there is an additional issue with 52 assuming a linear dependency between a covariate and accu-53 racy. The reason is again the fact that accuracy is bounded 54 between 0 and 1 -this is opposed to the assumed linear 55 relationship between the covariate and accuracy, which can 56 predict accuracies smaller than 0 and larger than 1, even 57 for values of the covariate present in the dataset (as seen in 58 Figure 6 .A). update the posterior estimate appropriately.
18
As before, we can perform the posterior predictive check, 
51
In the framework of hierarchical Bayesian estimation we 52 2 Since we usually test covariates which are likely to be related to accuracy based on prior substantive knowledge, testing this hypothesis is not very informative. Even if the slope is exactly zero, the estimation approach will give a narrow estimate around zero with enough data, providing the same conclusion. Alternatively, we can use Bayesian model comparison [46] between a model with the slope parameter and an intercept-only model.
can readily obtain accuracy estimates both at the subject-1 level and for different approaches individually, but we will 2 now proceed directly to the comparison of approaches, which 3 will address the main question of the study. First, we can 4 compute the posterior probability that the hybrid approach 5 is better in pairwise comparisons with the ERD and SSVEP 6 approaches: the probability that the hybrid approach is better 7 than the ERD approach and the SSVEP approach is 99.9% 8 and 68.0%, respectively. Moreover, we can also compare the 9 hybrid approach with the non-hybrid approaches (average of 10 the ERD and SSVEP estimates), and we obtain a probability of 11 99.0% that the hybrid approach is better. Whereas the post hoc 12 tests in the NHST analysis suggest there is no improvement in 13 using a hybrid approach over an SSVEP approach, Bayesian 14 estimation suggest that there is a non-negligible probability 15 that the hybrid approach is better.
16
However, since implementing a new BCI approach can be 17 costly in terms of time, effort, money, and computational re-18 sources, it is not usually enough to show that the improvement 19 is statistically significant, the improvement also needs to be 20 practically significant. In other words, we also need to estimate 21 the size of the improvement and indicate the precision of 22 this estimate. Although the Bayesian analysis indicates that 23 the hybrid approach is probably an improvement upon the 24 ERD and SSVEP approaches, the size of this improvement 25 is quite uncertain (see Figure 7 .C). This is most apparent in 26 the wide CI of the difference between the hybrid and SSVEP 27 approaches, which spans from large negative effects up to large 28 positive effects, with the posterior median of this difference 29 being 0.319 (logit scale), i.e. the odds of successful decoding 30 being 1.38 times bigger for the hybrid approach. This median 31 improvement in odds would correspond to a relative decrease 32 in error frequency of around 26%, with the SSVEP approach 33 making an error approximately once in 34 trials and the hybrid 34 approach making an error once in 46 trials. Although the 35 difference between the hybrid and the SSVEP approach was 36 deemed non-significant by NHST, and intuitively seemed small 37 on the probability scale (see Figure 7 .B), Bayesian estimation 38 with the logistic model shows that the difference might be 39 practically significant, although the data does not allow precise 40 estimates.
41
Moreover, in the case of estimates with insufficient preci-42 sion, the Bayesian framework provides simple guidance. A 43 follow-up study could be conducted to collect more data, and 44 the results of the present study could be used as a prior to 45 obtain more precise estimates via the Bayes' rule -in this 46 way knowledge can easily be accumulated across studies.
47
B. Possible misgivings about Bayesian estimation
48
One aspect of the proposed framework that might bother us, 49 is the seemingly subjective nature of the employed Bayesian 50 inference. One might argue: if the results of the inference de-51 pend on the prior, which should reflect subjective belief of the 52 analyst, how can they be presented as scientifically objective? 53 We can address this criticism from several viewpoints.
54
First, we should acknowledge that every statistical anal-55 ysis (or scientific inquiry, for that matter) has subjective 56 elements [47] . One possible concern with the proposed models are vi-10 olations of the underlying modeling assumptions. At the 11 lowest level of the proposed models we assume that the trials 12 are exchangeable (i.e. conditionally independent, given the 13 subject's accuracy). We can find two possible reasons for 14 this assumption to be violated. First, in BCIs the underlying 15 data being classified has temporal structure and therefore the 16 probability of correctly classifying a trial might be temporally 17 correlated. Second, accuracy is often obtained using k-fold 18 cross-validation. In this case exchangeability is also violated, 19 as we would not judge the test trials to be exchangeable across 20 folds. While some simulation-based studies have shown how 21 cross-validated results violate the assumptions of binomial 22 sampling [7, 51] , to the best of our knowledge, a correction for 23 this bias that could be integrated into a parametric model is not 24 known. Although this is an issue worthy of further research, we 25 would like to point out that the matter of violating assumptions 26 is as applicable to the framework we have described, as it is 27 to the usual NHST methods, which are also based on i.i.d. 28 assumptions.
29
There are also several computational issues which need to 30 be considered when using MCMC to estimate the parameters 31 of the proposed models. First, although MCMC procedures 32 are asymptotically exact, we cannot know with certainty that 33 the chains have converged to their stationary distribution and 34 that the samples we are using for inference are representa-35 tive of the true posterior distribution. There is a number of 36 heuristic diagnostics which can be used to detect the lack of 37 convergence, but passing these diagnostics does not guarantee 38 that the procedure has converged. Second, MCMC methods 39 can also be computationally intensive, although this has not 40 been a significant issue in the analyses conducted in this paper 41 (MCMC sampling in all three example datasets was done in 42 under a minute on a medium-grade computer). Moreover, the 43 typical signal processing and machine learning pipelines used 44 in BCI research to obtain subject-wise accuracies are orders of 45 magnitude more time-demanding than the statistical analyses 46 proposed here. Third, using MCMC we do not directly obtain 47 the model evidence p(y). Again, this has not been a significant 48 issue in this paper as we have mainly been concerned with the 49 estimation of model parameters, rather than model comparison 50 where the model evidence plays a role. In the case that some 51 of these issues turn out to be problematic in some practical 52 as the tail area of the null distribution:
53 Intuitively, we can interpret the p-value as the probability of 54 obtaining data that is as extreme as, or more extreme, than the 55 observed data, assuming the null hypothesis is true. As noted 56 before, in the given dataset the value of the t-statistic is 1.09 57 and the p-value is 0.29; hence, we would not reject H 0 at the 58 usual α = 0.05 significance level.
59
Let us now compare NHST with Bayesian estimation. As and the corresponding graphical model is shown in Figure 1 .B. 10 However, unlike NHST, we additionally need to define the 11 prior distribution p(θ) which formalizes information about the 12 parameters of the model that is available before observing the 13 data. Let us now additionally assume we a priori know that 14 the mean µ is unlikely to be larger than 9 in magnitude, and 15 the standard deviation σ cannot be larger than 10 -in this 16 case we might use the following independent priors: With the likelihood and the priors specified, we can proceed 26 to the estimation of parameters conditional on the observed 27 data. In contrast with NHST, the goal of statistical inference 28 is now to answer questions such as "what are the plausible 29 values of the model parameters θ given the observed data d?" 30 In the Bayesian framework this question is answered by the 31 posterior distribution p(θ|d). To obtain the posterior we use 32 the Bayes' rule: Since we will be concerned with the estimation of model 35 parameters, rather than comparison of different models, the 36 model evidence p(d) (i.e. marginal likelihood) in the denom-37 inator of Bayes' rule (which does not depend on parameters 38 θ) will not play a role, and can be considered just as a 39 proportionality constant.
40
By inspecting the properties of the posterior distribution 41 we can now interpret the results of the inference. For the 42 example dataset the inferred joint posterior p(µ, σ|d) is shown 43 in Figure 1 .C. Since the posterior will generally be high 44 dimensional and include parameters which may not be of 45 interest (i.e. nuisance parameters), we will often want to 46 obtain low dimensional probability distributions over particular 47 parameters (i.e. marginal distributions). We can obtain the 48 marginal posterior distribution for the parameter of interest 49 θ i as: [42, [56] [57] [58] . The details of the MCMC procedure we 32 employed are given in the subsection III-E ("Computational 33 details of the inference procedure").
34
With an MCMC sample {θ (1) , θ (2) , . . . , θ (T ) } we can easily parameter θ i can then be obtained using MC integration:
41
where setting g(·) to identity yields the ordinary mean. To
42
answer questions about the amount of probability mass within 43 an interval [l, u] we can also use MC approximation: Here and elsewhere in text we use the equi-tailed 95% CI, for which 2.5% of probability mass is both below and above it. An alternative choice is to use the highest posterior density (HPD) 95% CI, which is the shortest CI that contains the specified probability mass.
can be obtained by sorting the MCMC sample and taking the 1 parameter values corresponding to appropriate ranks.
2
When doing Bayesian estimation, we may often be inter- 
9
Here we take the top-down approach, with p( d|θ) modeling the 10 dependency of future data on the top-level parameters. In the 11 example dataset we might be interested in the posterior predic-12 tive distribution of a new sample y, which can be modeled in 13 the same way as observed data: y ∼ Normal(µ, σ). The poste-14 rior predictive distribution p( y|d) is shown in Figure 1 .A. The 15 computation of the posterior predictive distribution can again 16 be achieved using MCMC simulation, and the summaries are 17 obtained in an analogous way. As a check of the model fit, 18 we can conduct a posterior predictive check, i.e. we can check 19 (e.g. through graphical summaries such as Figure 1 .A) if the 20 posterior predictive distribution predicts data that is similar to 21 the one we have observed. If we see systematic differences 22 between the observed data and the predicted data, we might 23 want to revisit the modeling assumptions and do another 24 iteration of modeling and analysis.
